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Goal Setting - Research and Practice
It might be expected that the relationship between performance goals and
subsequent performance woiild be an interesting subject for psychological re-
search. V/ithin organizations, at least, individuals are surrounded by per-
formance goals — quotas, standards, budgets, "bogeys," deadlines — which,
whether set by themselves or others, are expected to influence their performance.
Performance goals have, indeed, received considerable attention in both the
psychological literature and the standard business budgeting literature. A
common misconception, perhaps emanating from the sheer mass of the literat\ire
is that the problem addressed in this paper, i.e., the effect of goal difficulty
on performance — has been thoroughly investigated. In presenting what is,
admittedly, an exploratory study, we feel it is necessary to attempt to demon-
strate that it has not.
Let us define a goal as a level of performance whose attainment is associ-
ated with "success" and non-attainuBnt with "failure." Thus defined, it will
include the psychological aspiration level-^ provided one interprets success
and failure as the individual performer's own subjective feelings associated
with attainnent. Consistency with the budgeting literature is more difficult
to achieve because of the general confusion among forecasts, plans, standards.
=/This quantity has been variously defined but the concept of subjective
feelings of success and failure depending upon whether the exact level aspired
to is reached appears to be ubiquitous, at least since the publication of the
definitive article of Lewin, Denbo, Festinger, and Sears {19Uh)»
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budgeta for control, etc., to be found there. —' It is probably adequate, however,
in our organizational context to include as goals performance levels whose achieve-
ment is recognized by some individuals in the organization — perhaps including
the individual or group whose performance is being measured ~ as constituting
success. Relying on constructs presented by Simon (1957), a goal may be viewed
as the point on the performance continuum which separates "satisfactory" from
"unsatisfactory" performance — i.e., a performance point associated with a
discontinuity in a satisfaction (or utility) function.
Budgeting literature and practice have implicitly assumed that goal-setting
has a beneficial effect on performance. Vilriters differ on the conditions re-
quired for these beneficial effects,- e.g.,"goals should (or should not) be
associated with specific rewards" — so that many variations may be found of
(frequently elaborate) goal-setting mechanisms which are assumed to benefit
performance. It is also universally assumed that "properly set" goals — i.e.,
according to the procedure advocated — will be accepted by their recipients.
This is equivalent to the assumption that the goal-setting mechanism produces
goals which are internalized as the individu£il aspiration levels of the
recipient — i.e., that he will experience subjective feelings of "success"
or "failure" on the basis of attainment or non-attainment. It has become
com^ion recently to assume that participation of the recipient in the goal-
setting process is both a necessary and/or sufficient condition for goal
acceptance and subsequent high performance. The evidence for these assumptions
is generally confined to having used the advocated set of procedures with some
success in one or another organization. Since the installation of goal-setting
procedures is necessarily accompanied by alterations in the organization's
—'For a more lengthy discussion of this problem, see Stedry (I960),
especially Chapters 1 and 6o
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iaformation and reporting systems and not infrequently results iVom a change
in management, it is impossible to determine from such evidence which of
the assumptions upon which the system is based are valid.
The variable of particular interest here is the difficulty level of the
goals arrived at. Where the budgeting literature treats of difficulty at all,
some variant of the statement "goals should be attainable but not too loose"
will be found. Lacking an operational definition of "attainable" — e.g.,
a frequency with which a goal should be attained — goal-setting in practice
seems to have e/^olved as a process of extrapolation of past data to obtain
a "goal" which is a prediction of performance. Performance ceteris paribus.
might be expected to fall short of the prediction about as often as it exceeds
it. However, these goals are attained with a sufficiently high frequency
that non-attainment is often referred to as an "exception" — an indication
that managenjent attention is required in the area in which the exception
occurred.—' Even if one assumes that the goals set are accepted without
question, it seems reasonable to expect that a system operating in the
presence of a significant amount of random noise can attain goals with such
regularity only if considerable slack is present — i.e., if the goals are
set quite low relative to possible levels of attaintment. Consideration of
this possibility s eems to be absent from the standard literatureo
^^ This principle of "management by exception" would s eem to contain an
assumption, frequently made explicit, that the exceptions should be relatively
few in number^.lest the (budgetary) system fail in its function as an allocator
of scarce higher management resources.
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In spite of the theory and evidence indicating that organizations
formulate goals for their activities —' and the almost ubiquitous presence
of budgets and quotas in organizations to influence behavior, systematic
investigation of the effects of goals on behavior is rare. Psychological
research on aspiration level has focused on how performance affects the
\
aspiration level determination or how the latter is affected by personality
variables or group influences. References will be found in Rotter (1954)
and Lewin et al (1944) to studies which relate performance in other tasks
to the aspiration level formation process used on the experimental task*
Neither those works nor the rnore recent svimmary of Starbuck (1963) appear to
indicate specific investigation of the effect of the aspiration level on
performaixe in the same task.
Exceptions to this general lack of interest win, of course be found.
Bayton (1943) appeared to have found some effect but it is unclear as to
whether the statistical techniques he used were appropriate. Siegel and
Fouraker (1959 ) foimd that presenting subjects in a bargaining experiment
with different aspirations for the outcome of the negotations effectively
determined the outcome. French, Kay, and Meyer (1962) found that performance^'
improvement was observed only in areas where specific goals were set as
opposed to admonitions that improvement was required. Haberstrch (1961)
found safety performance in a steel mill changing in response to changes in
goals set as part of a safety improvement program. None of these studies.
1/.See Cyert and March (1963)
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however, provide results specific to the prdalem of appropriate goal
difficulty level. Having (we hope) established both a need for research in
the area and a lack of firm empirical evidence upon which to base experimental
hypotheses, we will attempt to provide a modicum of theoretical justification
for the hypotheses to be proposed for this study.
Relevant Theory
Simon (1957) and March and Simon (1958) have postulated that a comparison
between current performance and a goal by an individual will elicit search
behavior -' if the comparison indicated performance to be below a satisfactory
level. Th\js, one might conclude that the higher a goal is set, the more likely
search behavior will be elicited. '
Stedry (i960), however, postulates a maximum tolerance level for a
discrepancy between a goal for future performance and current performance. If
this gap is too great, discouragement will result, accompanied either by
no search behavior or, perhaps, self-defeating frenzy rather than successful
improvenent-directed search. Experimenting with various goal difficulty
levels in a laboratory problem-solving situation, he found "high" and
"medium" goals to produce significantly better performance, on the average,
than "low" goals resembling the "attainable-but-not-too-loose" goals
recommended in the budgeting literature.-' High goals (which were almost
^'I.e., a search for alternative modes of behavior which vrill result in
an increase in performance, "Effort," throiaghout this paper may be interpreted
as the effort reqviired for this search.
—'The average performances observed with "mediiom" goals were better than
those observed with "high" goals but pairwise comparison here did not yield
significant differences.
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impossible to attain) appeared to produce extremely good performance where
the goal was presented prior to a questionnaire for determining the subject's
aspiration level on a particular trial ;vdiere the questionnaire was presented
first, subjects committed themselves to much lower goals than those which
the experimenter subsequently presented ( and which subjects probably rejected)
resxilting in extremely poor performance. Similar extremes in behavior were
not observed for medium or low goals suggesting sensitivity of high goal to
other conditions which might cause rejection of a goal ~ e.g., perception of
the goal as "impossible" of attainment based upon a comparison with other
estimates of the sitviation,.
Reasoning that in any real situation not one, but several goals will
exist for con^Daring performance in various dimensions with desired attainments,
Charnes and Stediy (1964) postvilate a "quasi-rational" goal recipient who
will allocate his effort so as to maximize the expected number of goals
attained or a similar fxuxtion with relative weights attached to each goal,—'
Unless weights are specified, quasi-rational b ehavior dictates allocating
effort only to those areas where a reasonable probability of attainment exists
although, within this set, more difficult goals will receive more effort.
Thus, reasoning from v^at might be at least reasonable behavior in the
multi-goal situation, increasing goal difficulty in an area already receiving
effort should increase the effort allocated to the area as well as the expected
—'Thus, "quasi-rational" behavior would be perfect rationality if the
reward function an individual faced was precisely of this fonn. However, in
the absence of such information, the behavior cannot be described as rational
in the economist's sense.
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perfcrmaxice in that area. Beyond a certaia point, however, fiirther increase
li) difficulty would drive the area out of the set of those receiving effort
with resultant decreioent in performance in the area. Clearly, an increase of
decrease in effort in one area would result, respectively, in a decrease or
increase in effort available for allocation to others assuming total effort
remains constant. A model of the effect of goal difficiilty on total effort
where more than one goal is presented does not now exist, a problem which will
be expanded upon later in the paper. The postulated effects on the performance
areas taken individually are generally consistent with the experimental work
of Stedry described above — i.e., difficult goals produce better performance
unless they are raised to the point where, in the proper circumstances, they
are rejected as being too high relative to performance expectations.
Thus, confining the above arguments to the case where only two performance
areas and goals are assvimed to be measurable and goals in non-measurable areas
and total effort are assumed to be unchanged we would obtain the following:
Hypothesis I x In each measurable performance area, a goal \
which represents an increase in performance over
previously attained levels if it is perceived as having
a "sufficiently high" probability of attainment will
improve performance relative to a goal which represents
little or no change from previous levels. If, however,
the perception of the probability of attainment of the
increase in required performance is not "sufficiently
high" performance will diminish relative to a goal
which represents little change from previous levels.
Hypothesis 2; Performance in one of the measurable areas
will be higher where the effort allocation to the other
measurable area is less. I.e., where the goal in the
other area is perceived as being ao high tnat no e ffort is
Justified, all o f the effort is available for allocation
to performance improvement in the first; less eff cert will
be available for the first where the other goal represents
little change from past performance; still less will be
avfiilable where the other is a goal requiring an increase
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in perfcrraance which is perceived as having a sufficiently
high probability of attainment.
Hypothesis 3 ; Where increases in performance are required by
goals in both of the measurable areas, the perceived pro-
babilities of the attainment of one will be likely to
be adversely affected by the perceived effort required
to attain the other. Thus, a greater proportion of
insufficiently high probabilities of attainment would
be expected.
Performance Measures
In the experimental field situation,data on only two performance areas
were sufficiently consistent in their measurement to be used. These were
productivity, the percentage of actual cost represented by the standard
cost of labor and material usage and rework, the combined labor and material
(actual) cost of repairing, reassembling, or replacing products retiirned by
inspection or other departments as unsatisfactory for use. These quantities
were computed weekly. -' The experimental subjects, nineteen foremen in a
department of a manxifacturing plant which manufactures precision components
for complex machinery, had been consistently measured on both of these
quantities. However, prior to the experiment, the foremen's supervisors,
unit managers, received reports on individual foremen and set goals only
in productivity; the rework reports, although collected, had not been distributed
to foremen or unit managers. —
'
1/ Thus, at lOQj productivity, actual and standard are equalj where actual
exceeds standard, productivity will be less than lOQ^ and conversely. Productiv-
ity records varied generally between 6C^ and 95^. Rework cost varied greatly
both by week and by individual; weekly averages varied from a few to several
hundred dollars.
^The authors obtained reports through the regular accotinting mechanism, not
desiring to provide a Hawthorne effect during the period of analysis of historic-
al data. Only when discussing the goals for manipulation with unit managers did
we discover the lack of distribution. The unit managers promptly demanded (and
received) these reports, thus inti-oducing a Hawthorne effect of another kind. Our
previous experience would, however, indicate that it is impossible for an experi-
menter to avoid increasing the data flow in an organization.
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Althou^ we had originally intended to study forty foremen, preliminary
discussions revealed that managers of some vmits did not feel that these
measures, albeit collected periodically, were meaningful for their sub-
ordinates. Whatever the validity of this opinion (since the unit managers
both set goals for and evaluated performance of their subordinates) its effect
would be to render any results obtained from these units spurious. The data
were considered meaningful for twenty-three foremen bvit one unit manager re-
fused to cooperate in the study reducing the sample to nineteen.
An attempt to extend the manipulation to eight other foremen in two iinits
where managers suggested substitute measures they considered meaningful was
thwarted by transfer of one vmit manager early in the experimental period and,
""in the other unit, by an insufficient number of readings taken on the sub-
stitute measure which was not normally collected throv»gh the department
accounting system, -'
Experimental Design
An arbitrary assumption was made that average performance for a period
-'Whatever the failings of data collected in financial terms and the
assumptions made in the classification of data according to accounting
principles, it is generally impossible to collect any consistently reliable
performance data except through the regular accounting system. The constrainto
of double-entry, audit, and check may appear oppressive but the presence of
a set of figures appearing week after week without missing observations (e,g.,
we were too busy to worry about it that week) and without weekly Vficriations
in what the figures measvtre seems to be available in no other way.
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of six months prior to the experiment represented "normal" performance -' and
that a goal set to maintain that average performance over the experimental
period of three months would be perceived by the recipients as "easy" to attain.
A goal to achieve significantly higher-than-average performance, specifically
at the first quartile of the twenty-six weekly performance figures for the six-
month period,^ was considered to be "difficult" to attain and, it was assumed,
would be perceived as "challenging" or "impossible" to attain. For simplicity,
we refer to normal (N) and difficult (D) goals and easy (E), challenging ( C)
and impossible (I) goal perceptions.
The ioremen were divided into four conditions: (l) N productivity,
N rework; (2) N productivity, D rework; (3) D productivity, N rework; and
(ill.) D productivity, D rework. Thus, a foreman in the first group had goals
based on an extrapolation of past performance. One in the second or third
group had a goal in one area which, provided it was not perceived as impossible,
would allocate more effort to that az^a than he had previously. In the foiurth
group, increased effort allocation to both areas is called for which mxist
emanate from other "immeasurable" performance areas if both are to be accepted
as challenges.
The allocation of foremen to groups was not done randomly but by a process
which satisfied two criteria: (1) at least one of each of the four lanit
managers' subordinates must be in each group; and (2) the average age of foremen
3/in each of the four groups must be approximately the same. "'' The experimental
J 2 /
'
* ' In a few cases it was necessary to make adjustments to these figures
where marked changes in performance occurred during the three-month "base period"
which elapsed while the data were analyzed fuid the unit managers prepared for
their role in the experiment,
3/^k formal minimization was not carried out but the averages differed by
less than a year with a range over the sample of 30 years.
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design, eliminating two foremen vdio may have misunderstood their goals,
shown in Table 1»
1/ is
^^^^--^-..^^^^ Rework
T, , 77t!rr---^ GoalProductivlty^^>.^,^^^
Goal ^""-"---^^
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The purposes of these interviews were: (l) to determine whether the manipu-
lation had been successful; and (2) to determine whether the foreman perceived
his goals as easy, challenging, or impossible. The interviews were largely
open-ended. However, a specific attempt was made to ascertain, by direct
question, the nvunber of "chances in 10" the foreman perceived to be his likeli-
hood of attainment of the goal. This answer was accepted as a prima facie
categorization and, unless we were thoroughly convinced from other features
of the interview that an individual was obviously misplaced, a perception of
8 chances in 10 or better was considered "easy," 3 to 7 "challenging" and
2 or fewer "impossible,"-^ Exceptions to the categorization were made only
where individuals who said something like "oh 50-50" after an impressively
long list of rationalizations as to why improvement in the area couldn't be
made were classified as having an impossible perception or where individuals
who emphatically stated "100 percent" along with a long list of things
that would need to be done or happen for the goal to be made were classified
as have a chcillenging perception.
Considering the arbitreiriness of the classification, the success of the
manipulation was remarkable. AH twenty difficult goals were classified as
—'It should be noted that these probabilities are significantly higher
than would be predicted on the basis of sampling theory. The N goals, averages
of past performance, would be expected to be attained 50 percent of the time,
assuming independence of pierformance and goal. Similarly, a D goal, determined
as the first quartile of performance for 26 weeks and set for averapie perform-
ance in a 13-week period, would, with appropriate assumptions of normality, and
independence, be approximately eqxiivalent to a 3-sigma limit. As indicated
earlier, either becavise goals do serve to effect their own attainment and/or
because of a substantial difference between potential performance and past
performance the levels of attainment predicted by the usual statistical means
appear to be irrelevant except, perhaps, as indicators of relative
attainability.
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having either challenging or impossible perceptions. Fifteen of the
eighteen normal goals were classified as having easy perceptions and two of
the remaining three represented one individual, Thxis 17 of the 19 foremen
had perception classifications consistent with the manipvilation. It was
decided at this stage to eliminate the 2 inconsistent respondees on the
assun^tion that the erroneous classification might have disclosed misunder-
standing of the goals.
Results
Average perfonnanceP in both productivity £ind rework were observed for
a thiirteen-week base period prior to the manipulation and an experimental
period of thirteen weeks immediately following. Denoting by P and P^ the
productivity averages during the base and experimental periods, respectively,
and by R and R, the corresponding rework averages we define improvements
P
I_ and Ip as:
Pl-^o
I - lOOx p
*^
o
and
Ijj - 100 X
Productivity increase and rework decrease represent improvement; hence,
negative values of I and L indicate deterioration in performance. Since
P "
the distribution of L appears to be highly skewed and any assumptions relating
to normality would be difficixlt to Justify in any event, non-parametric
methods have been used for all statistical analyses. For completeness,
however, the actual percentage improvements have been shown in Table 2 with

-lA-
Rework Productivity
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the mean performance improvement shovm by goal perception.
In terms of these data, hypothesis 1 relating to the superiority of
challenging over easy iOE) and easy over impossible (E>l) goals in effecting
performance improvement may be tested using performance ranks. Of Ih challeng-
ing and easy rework goal perceptions, the former ranked 1, 2, 3> 6, 9, 10, 12;
under the null hypothesis (C E) the probability of this rankiiig or one more
extreme occurring is .130. —' Comparing either C or E vidth I, the probability
that I rework perceptions will rank 8, 9, and 10 of 10 (the most extreme case)
is only .008 under the null hypothesis. Examining productivity improvements,
it is clear that C > E cannot be confirmed; if anything, the data indicate
2/
E > C. —' Comparing C or E with I, however, the probability that the I
productivity goal perceptions will rank lowest is .028 (C > I) and .022 (E > I).
3/
Thus, confirmation "^ is provided for the inferiority of goals perceived as
impossible. Only the weakest form of confirmation, and only in one of the
areas tested, could be found for the superiority of goals perceived as
challenging over those perceived as easy:
—'The I-Iann-Whitney U-test is used for all rank comparisons between pairs
of groups. The overall group differences in ranked improvements for both pro-
ductivity and rework are significant at better than the .05 level by Kmiskal
Vi'allis one-way einalysis of variance. A description of these tests will be
found in Siegel (1956), pp. 116-12? and 184-193.
2/ Were this tested, the probability would be .164. This result has no
significance other than to seirve as a caution agsdnst drawing any firm con-
clusions from C > E for rework with p «» .130,
3/^ Subject, of course, to the obvioxis 1 1 mitations occasioned by the small
sample size*
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For the purpose of testing hypothesis 2, the ranked data are grouped
as shob/n in Table 3* Here again.
Rework Goal Perception
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The data do not conform to the hypothesis. While the relationship
between productivity improvement where challenging and easy rework goals
are perceived is in the predicted direction the relationship is reversed for
rework improvement. However, it may be presximed from confirmation of the
portion of hypothesis 1 that performances observed in the area with a goal
perceived as impossible required little effort. Whether because effort
was expended uselessly or total effort expenditure went down in response
to an impossible goal perception or for some other reason, the performances
recorded in the competing area did not reflect a greater (successful) usage
of effort.
Support for, but not confirmation of, hypothesis 3 is provided by
the data. Four of the five cases in which impossible perceptions were
recoiHied occurred in the group vhich had two difficvilt goals. Two of these,
however, were recorded for the same individual, lending further support
to the notion that, in place of hypothesis 2, a composite hypothesis in-
corporating the effect of an impossible goal perception on total effort
as well as effcrt allocation must be proposed*
Ex-Post Analysis
Failing to confirm any of the ex ante hypotheses but observing a
pattern to their failure, we analyzed the data further in an attempt to
formulate alternatives which might be useful for planning additional
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Re-exarainat-ion of Table 1 reveals that whatever the perception aaaumed
for the difficult goals, they tend to be concentrated at the ends of the
scale. If we were to state, rather than hypothesis 1 (C > E > I), a more
general form, viz, , difficult goals produce extremes in performance. This
is tantamount to assuming that goals as difficult as those chosen will pro-
duce either very good or very poor performance but it is impossible to
predict, a priori, by interview or other means at which extreme performance
associated with a particular goal (or individual ) will fall.
Depicting the data as shown in Figure 1,
Improvement Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1?
Productivity GoaJ.
Rework Goal
= N,oi*mal Goal = Difficult Goal
Figure 1
Goals for Productivity and Rework and Associated Improvement Ranks
In view of the small size of the sample it is unlikely that "confirma-
tion" of ex ante hypotheses would have yielded much more, V/hile it is true, of
course, that if the researcher formulates and tests a sufficient number of hypo-
theses he will necessarily find some that attain statistical significance wheth-
er or not he formulated these hypotheses before examining the data. The formal
testing of ex post hypotheses immediately suggested by the form of the data does
not produce any great discrepancy between the "real" significance levels and the
normal levels provided by the statistical analysis.
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it will be observed that the "span" of improvement ranks from the highest
to the lowest is greater in each area for difficult than normal goals -
e.g., 1 to 17 as opposed to 4 to 14 in rework. Using a test for extreme
reactions developed by Moses, -' the probability that extremes as marked
as those occurring by chance under the null hypothesis in the distribution of
productivity scores is .0880; for rework this probability is .0814.
Assuming, for the moment, that difficult goals do in fact produce extremes,
the next logical step is to test the proposition that performance extremes
observed in response to difficult goails in an area will be marked where a
difficult goal has been pi^sented in the other area - i.e., that the extreme-
producing effects will be intensified by a difficult goal elsewhere.
For the purpose of this analysis performances in each area were
examined separately for groups which had normal and difficult goals in the
other. For this purpose the data were grouped as depicted in Figure 1. It
will be observed immediately that the performance extremes observed to be
associated with difficult goals are more marked in each area vrtiere a difficult
goal was imposed in the other. The probability of observations as extreme
as those observed for difficult goals in productivity in the group that also
had difficult goals in rework is .119 vinder the null hypothesis; for
^ Cf , Siegel, (1956), pp. 145-152. Tho Moses test allows for discarding
in advance a number, h , of the highest and lowest observations in the
group assumed to be non-extreme adjusting the occuirence probabilities
accordingly. All tests used here, however, were made with h = 0.
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rework the corresponding probability is .083* % contrast, improvements vrith
difficult goals do not show this tendency where noraal goals are presented
in the other ar«a, -'
Coal in Competing Area——
S
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X
0)
s
a>
>
Note:
Circled Observations indicate
exceptions to regional designations
Improvement Index
» 17 - Improvement Rank
Perceptions:
C •» Challenging
E = Easy
I - Impossible
(Productivity Listed First)
Two Challenging
One Challenging
One Easy
One Impossible
Two Impossible
c / A 3 'f 5 t 7 ^ *? /«> " '=^'*"' '-^ "*
I I I I ( I N
Productivity Improvement Index
Figure 3
Goal Perceptions Arranged by Productivity
and Rework Improvements
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performance areas compete for effort. -^ The fact that the lines delin-
eating the regions cannot be drawn as normals to a Z»5-degree line dravm
from the origin suggests that greater effort is reqxiired for improvement in
one area — rework — than the other relative to the improvments made by
others* The non-parallelism of the lines that can be drawn suggests a
greater impact of challenge in one area - rework - on total challenge
2/perceived in the situation. -^
Let us define a simple trichoton;/ on the goal perceptions such that:
. ( 1 when goal in jth area is perceived as challenging /
u^ ss) Owhen goal in jth area is perceived as easy r .
^
|-1 when goal in jth area is perceived as impossible H ^*
where the superscripts p and r will refer, respectively to productivity and
rework. We may loosely consider u = u*^ + u as the "total challenge"
represented by the pair of goals, B" so, it will be observed that the
regions in the graph can be relabeled so that they correspond, starting f3X)m
the top, to u's of 2, 1, 0, -1, and -2 with the exception that, with this
designation, the point (3*0) is misplaced. Using this designation, however,
none of the exceptions noted on the graph is in a total challenge category
which differs from its own by more than 1.
—'The improvement "index" used is simply a transformation of the improve-
ment rank such that higher numbers are associated with greater performance
improvement •
2/
-' I.e., it is impossible to draw parallel lines of 45-degree slope
which divide the set of points as well*
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All of the foregoing lead to possibility that total perfoniiance and
total challenge are related. Let us define:
jr = productivity improvement index = 17 - (productivity improvement rank)
y H rework improvement index »» I7 - (rework improvement rank)
and, ignoring possible differenceP in performance difficulty in the two areas:
y y^ + y s total Improvement index.
The relationships suggested by the data are:
y «= Bj^ + B^ u
or
y = ^1 + ^2 ^^ -^ ^3 ^"^
where, in the second instance, we are assuming differential effects of
challenge in the two areas* Using the usual least-squares regression
techniques, the relationships are found to be:
y - 13.30 + 5.10 u
(+ 1.29) (± 1.11)
and
y'- 13.45 + 3.55 uP + 6.40 u*"
(+1.28) (ll,72) (±1.56;
In either relationship the regression coefficients (adjusted for the mean -
i.e.* ^2* fz ^^ ^3 ^ ^^ highly significant (p < .001). The first,
using only "total challenge*' accovints for 58.5 percent of the variance and the
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second 61,2 percent - an insignificant difference. Thus, little advantage
appeared to be gained by discriminating between the areas in which challenge
occurred. It is probable that an index which gave more weight to the rework
performance would improve the relationship but, considering the small amount
of variance remadning to be explained, the improvement could only be slight.
The actual and predicted values of performance are shown in Table 3*
Summary
The hypotheses fonnulated ex ante could not be confirmed. Perceptions
of a goal in an area as challenging, easy, and impossible did not produce
performance improvement in that order in the area; nor did performance in
the other area follow the reverse order. Sample size was insufficient to
test the greater effect of two difficult goals on production of impossible
perceptions. Support was provided for the proposition that difficult goals
perceived as impossible produced poorer performance improvement than goals
perceived either as easy or challenging.
Further analysis of the data revealed that, had the performance hypotheses
been stated in the absence of perception — i.e., difficult goals will pro-
duce either very good or very poor performance relative to normal goals —
confirmation would have been obtained. Furthermore, difficult goals in an
area appeared to be associated with extremes in perfonncince •vdien the other
area had a difficult goal, but this effect was not observed with a normal
goal in the second area. Finally, althoxigh perceptions were not successful
in predicting performance in one area, the combined performance in the two
areas could be represented quite well as a linear function of the goal per-
ceptions in the two areas.
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DlBcussion
The failure to confirm the ex ante hypotheses could be attributed to the
inability of the interview technique to satisfactorily distinguish between
challenging and impossible perceptions, A thorough re-examination of the
interview records undertaken after the initial tests revealed that this was
unlikely. The interviews of those judged as impossible differ markedly from
those judged as challenging. The difficult distinction to draw is that between
easy and challenging. It is also interesting that were the low-producing
individuals who wore classified as challenging to be reclassified as im-
possible the relationships depicted in Figure 3 would be aaversely affected
to a remarkable degree. If anything, recategorization of the low-scoring
individuals with difficult goals from challenging to easy seama more consistent
with the interviews and would improve both the relationships in Figure 3 and
the regressions. (This recategorization would also provide data which confirm
C > E in each area,)
Such a recategorization would not only vitiate any scientific import
in the study. It would detract from the basic generalization to which the
data all seem to point. Supejrvisors using seme kind of gosil-setting procedures
are probably no more capable than experimenters of interpreting the statements
of their subordinates as to challenge perceived associated with a goal. While
it is reasonable to expect better communication between foremen and their
supervisors than with an interviewer, the former is subject to bias of another
kind — e.g., if the supervisor is perceived as rating the response as well as
performance. It is quite possible that an individual does not know in advance
how he will respond to a particular goal in which case mechanisms which in-
corporate this a priori response - e.g., participative budgeting — would seem
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to offer little more promise than other schemes*
Given that difficult goals perceived as challenging did appear to enhance
overall performance, and difficult goals perceived as impossible appeared
easy enough to detect, the use of difficult goals with a mechanism for
revision if an Impossible perception is detected seems worthy of further
investigation. The use of difficult goals in a particular area with the
expectation of improvement in that area seems problematical*
What is strongly suggested for future theoretical work is the need for
models which Incorporate "total challenge" as some function of all of the
goal perceptions Involved. Within each of these "total challenge" detennln-
ations it is not unreasonable to assume competition between perfoi*mance areas
for total effort, ^ Further research is, of course, also called for to
determine the long-inin effects of different kinds of stable goal-setting
procedures. The current study underlines the inadequacy of assuming that a
particular kind of policy will produce certain effects without a thoro\igh-
golng investigation of the real effects as reflected in performance.
^ It will be observed from Figure 3 that within each region the two
performance improvements are, in general, negatively correlated*
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